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Abstract: Since it is impossible to predict and identify all the 
vulnerabilities of a network beforehand, and penetration into a 
system by malicious intruders cannot always be prevented, 
intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are essential entities to ensure 
the security of a networked system.  To be effective in carrying out 
their functions, the IDSs need to be accurate, adaptive, and 
extensible. Given these stringent requirements and the high level of 
vulnerabilities of the current days’ networks, the design of an IDS 
has become a very challenging task. Although, an extensive 
research has been done on intrusion detection in a distributed 
environment, distributed IDSs suffer from a number of drawbacks 
e.g., high rates of false positives, low detection efficiency etc. In 
this paper, the design of a distributed IDS is proposed that consists 
of a group of autonomous and cooperating agents. In addition to its 
ability to detect attacks, the system is capable of identifying and 
isolating compromised nodes in the network thereby introducing 
fault-tolerance in its operations. The experiments conducted on the 
system have shown that it has a high detection efficiency and low 
false positives compared to some of the currently existing systems. 
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1. Introduction 
There have been two different approaches for securing 
networks and host computers from malicious attackers: i) 
intrusion prevention mechanisms that include cryptographic 
techniques to safeguard sensitive information from 
unauthorized access, ii) intrusion detection mechanisms that 
recognize an ongoing attack on a system and respond 
appropriately to thwart such intrusive attempts. An intrusion 
detection system (IDS) is a security mechanism that can 
monitor and detect intrusions to the computer systems in real 
time. An IDS can be either host-based (sources of data are 
operating systems and applications audit trails), or network-
based (monitor and analyze network traffic), or a 
combination of both these types.  Conventional approaches to 
intrusion detection involving a central unit to monitor an 
entire system have several disadvantages [1]. To circumvent 
the demerits of a centralized IDS, the research in the field of 
intrusion detection over the last decade has been heading 
towards a distributed framework of monitors that do local 
detection and provide information to perform global 
detection of intrusions. In these systems, the local intrusion 
detection components look for local intrusions and pass the 
analysis of their results to the upper levels of the hierarchy. 
The components at the upper levels analyze the refined data 
from multiple lower level components and seek to establish a 
global view of the system state. Gopalakrishna and Spafford 
[1] argue that such an IDS is not really a distributed system 
because data analysis activity is performed at the nodes 
situated at the higher level of hierarchy in a centralized 
fashion. In such systems, transfer of data among the nodes 
can be a problem as it can lead to security breaches. 
Moreover, these systems suffer from the drawback of a single 
point of failure. An intruder can take control of the whole 
system if he or she can compromise the central server. Thus 
design of a distributed IDS is a challenging task and a 
number of issues are to be taken into consideration for this 
purpose, e.g.: reduction of the false positives, sufficient 
protection against compromised nodes, a secure 
communication mechanism between the distributed 
components etc.  
In this paper, the scheme of a distributed IDS is presented. 
This is an extension of our earlier work presented in [2]. The 
IDS consists of a large number of autonomous agents that 
cooperate with each other for detecting any intrusive activity 
in the system. The system uses coordinated surveillance by 
incorporating inter-agent communication and distributed 
computing in decision making to identify early signs of an 
attack and recognize situations that are likely to happen 
before an attack takes place (e.g., systematic scanning of the 
network resources). It also raises an appropriate alarm 
whenever an attack is detected. The two primary goals of the 
proposed security mechanism are: 
• Detection of intrusive activities: In addition to its ability 
to respond to an attack, the system should be able to alert 
the system administrator whenever it finds any sign of 
pre-attack activities. By local monitoring and sharing 
individual belief-estimates, the agents in the system can 
recognize and preempt activities that resemble security 
threats. 
• Identifying and isolating compromised hosts: The system 
should be capable of detecting and isolating compromised 
nodes. This feature is incorporated in the system by 
implementing a distributed trust mechanism between the 
communicating agents. 
Any IDS is required to handle uncertainties related to the 
domain and environment in which it works.  To model this 
uncertainty, the agents in the proposed system represent their 
knowledge about attacks scenarios in the form of Bayesian 
networks [3]. This knowledge is introduced into the agents 
from analysis of repositories of data related to network 
attacks. The knowledge is distributed so that each agent is 
required to monitor only a relatively few aspects of the local 
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network. However, the agents share their beliefs and through 
timely coordination of the agents, the system is able to detect 
more complex distributed attacks. To enable such distributed 
inference, the concept of multiply sectioned Bayesian 
networks (MSBN) [4] is utilized for representation of domain 
knowledge. The clique-tree propagation algorithm [5] is used 
for reasoning. To reduce network congestion and message 
overhead, the agents are grouped into sub-domains 
(localities), so that majority of the communications among 
the agents are within the sub-domains only. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 
presents some existing work on distributed intrusion 
detection systems. Section 3 provides some background 
information about Bayesian networks and MSBNs. Section 4 
describes the architecture of the proposed system and the 
agents constituting the IDS. Section 5 presents a brief 
overview of the communication mechanism and security of 
communication among the agents in the system. Section 6 
describes how the concept of Bayesian networks is applied in 
intrusion detection and how inferences can be drawn using an 
MSBN framework. Section 7 presents a distributed trust 
management among the peer hosts that provides fault-
tolerance in the proposed security mechanism. Section 8 
gives the details of experiments conducted on the prototype 
architecture and the results obtained. Finally, Section 9 
concludes the paper identifying some future scope of work. 
2. Related Work 
The approach of distributed intrusion detection is not new. 
Many researchers have proposed systems based on 
distributed detection of intrusions in large networks. In this 
section, some of these schemes are discussed briefly.  
Snapp et al proposed DIDS - a distributed intrusion 
detection system that consists of host managers and LAN 
managers for distributed data monitoring and sending of 
notable events to the DIDS director [6]. The managers also 
do some local detection and pass the summaries to the 
director. At the local level, DIDS uses both statistical and 
rule-based detection, and at the global level it uses a rule-
based expert system. The director analyzes the events to 
determine the security state of the system. This centralized 
nature of the director is clearly the bottleneck of the 
distributed approach of DIDS. 
Porras and Neumann have presented a framework called 
EMERALD for distributed intrusion detection [7]. It employs 
monitors at the levels of hosts, domains and enterprises to 
develop an analysis hierarchy. It uses subscription-based 
communication scheme, both within and between the 
monitors. However, the inter-monitor subscription scheme is 
hierarchical in nature and limits access to the events or 
results from the layer immediately below. 
AAFID is a distributed intrusion detection system 
developed in CERIAS at Purdue University [8][9]. AAFID 
employs agents at the lowest level of the hierarchy for data 
collection and analysis and transceivers and monitors at the 
higher levels for controlling agents and obtaining a global 
view of activities. It also uses filters within the hosts for 
identifying the relevant observations for intrusion detection. 
Essentially, the filters are data selection and abstraction 
layers, which provide a subscription-based service to the 
agents. 
Dickerson et al have proposed a fuzzy intrusion 
recognition engine (FIRE) for network intrusion detection 
that uses fuzzy systems to assess malicious activity inside a 
computer networks [10]. It utilizes AAFID architecture as the 
base platform. 
Qin et al have proposed deployment of a number of 
lightweight agents called ID agents to various network 
components for intrusion detection [11]. Each agent is 
specialized in a certain category of intrusion. For example, 
the host-based ID agents can analyze BSM audit data, system 
call traces and user behaviors. On the other hand network ID 
agents are responsible for network level attacks, such as 
DDoS and probing attacks. The proposed architecture is 
hierarchical and it divides the protection and analysis scope     
into three levels: local, regional and global. 
Frincke et al have developed a prototype called the 
Hummingbird System at the University of Idaho [12]. It is a 
distributed system that employs a set of hummer agents, each 
assigned to a single host or a set of hosts. Each hummer 
interacts with other hummers in the system through a 
manager, a subordinate, and a peer relationship. The 
managers may transmit commands to subordinates. The 
commands include instructions for gathering or stop 
gathering data, forward or stop forwarding data etc. Peers 
may send requests for data forwarding, gathering or receiving 
to peers. The peer decides whether to honor such requests. 
The Hummingbird system is intended to allow the 
administrator to monitor security threats on multiple 
computers from one central location. 
Gopalakrishna and Spafford [1] have presented the 
architecture of an intrusion detection system that is built with 
a collection of distributed, autonomous and cooperative 
agents. In the interest-based cooperation and communication 
model proposed by the authors, the agents request and 
receive information solely on the basis of their interests. The 
agents can also specify new interests as a result of a new 
event or alert. As a major advantage, the entire system is not 
compromised if an agent fails. Instead, there is a graceful 
degradation of system performance. 
However, most of the hierarchical distributed intrusion 
detection systems have the following drawbacks [1]: 
• Analysis hierarchy: As there is a hierarchy in data 
analysis and data analysis takes place at all levels of the 
hierarchy, these systems are very difficult to change. In 
the wake of a new distributed attack, changes may have to 
be made in modules at many (if not all) levels. 
• Data refinement: When a module form a lower level 
sends results of data analysis to a higher level, some data 
refinement is done. However, the knowledge of what 
events are important on a system-wide level is 
circumstantial and is difficult to infer at the lower levels 
of the hierarchy. If refinement is strict, we may end up 
losing some system-wide notable events and if the 
refinement is loose, the higher- level analysis modules 
will be flooded with large amounts of data from the lower 
levels. Finding an a priori suitable compromise may be 
difficult. 
• Bulky modules at all levels of the hierarchy: Intrusion 
analysis engines based on anomaly detection are large 
modules. They consume a significant amount of resources 
in terms of CPU usage, disk I/O and memory usage, as 
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they have to analyze long audit trails and system state 
information. In the systems described above, these 
components are present at all levels of the hierarchy. 
Such components present multiple points of failure. 
Degrading or disabling a top-level component would 
severely limit the detection capability of the system. 
Moreover, such bulky components are expensive to 
replicate to achieve fault-tolerance. 
• Passive interactions among modules: The components of 
the intrusion detection system interact with each other in 
a passive way. The lower level components generate data 
for the upper level components as per the rules driving 
them. There is no mechanism for a component to query 
other component on the basis of some analysis that it has 
done. 
The subscription-based communication mechanism 
between monitors in EMERALD and between the agents and 
filters in AAFID offers a mechanism for active interaction. 
But in EMERALD, it is limited to occur between the 
adjacent levels of the hierarchy and in AAFID, it is allowed 
only within a host.  
Ning et al. have recognized the importance of a querying 
facility in cooperative intrusion detection systems [13][14]. 
Accordingly, the authors have proposed an extension to the 
common intrusion specification language (CISL) [15] that 
allows intrusion detection components to specify requests for 
particular information from other components. 
Some authors have proposed the use of mobile agents in 
intrusion detection. Mell and McLarnon [16] have argued 
that the major problem with hierarchical intrusion detection 
systems is due to static locations of the components. They 
have proposed modeling these components as mobile agents. 
Helmer and Wong [17] have presented a system that uses 
lightweight mobile agents for intrusion detection. These 
agents are dynamically updateable and upgradeable, and due 
to their smaller size, they are faster to transport. However, 
mobile agents have serious security concerns and have 
restricted execution environment. Yang et al have proposed a 
scheme called CARDS that generates and distributes 
detection tasks among monitors to cooperatively detect 
attacks [18]. Detection tasks are parts of an attack signature, 
which the authors refer to as predefined queries. However, 
there is no support for active querying in the proposed 
architecture. 
Thames et al have presented a hybrid intelligent IDS that 
utilizes a Bayesian network and self-organizing map (SOM) 
[19]. The experimental results have shown that the 
performance of the hybrid intelligent IDS is better compared 
to the systems based non-hybrid Bayesian learning approach. 
Jemili et al have proposed a framework for an adaptive 
intrusion detection system that utilizes Bayesian networks 
[20]. Any new network data that is considered intrusive by 
the system is added to the dataset of the Bayesian network 
and the knowledge-base of the system is updated 
periodically. 
Silva et al have implemented an architecture of a remote 
IDS using the technology of multi-agent systems, web 
services and model-driven architecture (MDA) [21]. The 
model adapts and extends the concept of network intrusion 
detection systems, so that the users can use the services 
provided by the remote IDS without having any IDS on their 
local hosts. The IDS functionalities are provided as a set of 
accessible services on the Internet through Web Services. 
Ye has presented an agent-based peer-to-peer distributed 
intrusion detection framework in which functionalities of 
each agent has been implemented using JACK/UML 
approach [22]. The knowledge of each agent is represented 
using an ontological framework. An efficient task allocation 
protocol is used to coordinate different hosts in the system to 
collaboratively detect distributed attacks. 
Zhao et al have presented a data fusion-based intrusion 
detection model, in which the detection process is divided 
into three levels: basic, information and knowledge [23]. The 
authors have computed an input matrix that introduces 
Dempster- Shafer theory to the information level of the 
whole detection so that the results of different detection 
methods and heterogeneous data in the system can be fused 
together. Moreover, the intrusion scenario and the system’s 
security situation can be extracted at a higher level. 
Zeng and Guo have proposed an agent-based IDS that can 
be integrated into the applications of enterprise information 
systems [24]. The system consists of three kinds of agents: 
the client agents, the server agents, and the communication 
agents. The agents are integrated to an access control model 
that enhances the security in the system. To make the system 
design standardized, the authors have used standard agent 
design and communication protocols such as knowledge 
query and manipulation language (KQML) [25] and 
intrusion detection message exchange format (IDMEF) [26]. 
Da Silva et al have proposed an IDS for mobile devices 
that uses detection mechanisms based on the behavior 
profiles of the devices and data packets transmitted in a 
wireless network [27]. This mechanism is particularly suited 
for resource constrained wireless devices. 
For detecting Internet worms, Rasheed et al. have 
proposed a special-purpose intrusion detection mechanism 
based on traffic signatures [28]. The system has two 
algorithms. The first algorithm, called the intelligent failure 
connection algorithm (IFCA) is a worm detection algorithm 
based on the concept of artificial immune system. The second 
algorithm, called the traffic signature algorithm (TSA) 
captures the signatures from the network traffic and looks for 
pattern matching with an Internet worm.  
Toutonji and Yoo have presented a novel approach to 
modeling a worm attack on a computer network [29]. The 
authors have argued that different parts of a network have 
different levels of defense requirements and different 
immunity measures. Accordingly, they have developed a 
model for splitting the network into two parts: a highly 
immune part of the network (HIN) and a partially immune 
part of the network (PIN). The authors have evaluated the 
effectiveness of their proposed model by implementing 
network defense measurements which are adopted from the 
human immune system. Simulation results have demonstrated 
that infections due to worms have minimal impact on the 
HIN. 
The proposed approach in this paper is different from the 
above schemes since it is based on intelligent coordination 
among the agents and utilizes the reasoning and analytical 
capabilities of a Bayesian network and an MSBN. The 
intelligence in cooperation is achieved by communicating 
events and alerts to only those agents in the system that are 
interested in those events and alerts. The description of the 
proposed system is given in the following sections. 
131 
International Journal of Communication Networks and Information Security (IJCNIS)                                       Vol. 2, No. 2, August 2010 
 
3. Multiply Sectioned Bayesian Networks 
In this section, some background information about Bayesian 
networks and MSBNs are given.  The proposed IDS is based 
on these concepts and thus a basic knowledge of them is 
required for proper understanding of the proposed security 
mechanism.   
3.1 Bayesian Networks 
Bayesian networks are probabilistic models that exploit the 
conditional independence properties present in a task domain 
to reduce both the space required to store the model and the 
time needed to compute posterior probabilities upon receipt 
of evidence. Formally, we can define a Bayesian network as a 
graph in which the following conditions hold [30]: 
(a) A set of random variables constitutes the set of nodes of 
the network. 
(b) A set of directed edges connects pairs of nodes. The 
intuitive meaning of an arrow from node Vi  to node Vj is 
that Vi has a direct influence on Vj. 
(c) Each node has a conditional probability table that 
quantifies the effects that the parents have on the node. 
The parents of a node are all those nodes that have 
arrows pointing to it.  
(d) The graph has no directed cycles; hence it is a directed 
acyclic graph (DAG). 
The defining property of a Bayesian network is that the 
conditional probability of any node given any subset of non-
descendants is equal to the conditional probability of that 
same node given its parents alone. In other words, a Bayesian 
network represents the exponentially sized joint probability 
distribution (JPD) in a compact manner. Every entry in the 
JPD can be computed from the information in the Bayesian 
network by (1) : 
          ))(|(),....,(
1
1 ∏
=
=
n
i
iin xParentsxPxxP             (1) 
where, xi ‘s are the variables and Parents ( xi ) represents 
the parent set of the variable xi [31]. 
3.2 Multiply Sectioned Bayesian Networks 
MSBNs provide a coherent framework for probabilistic 
reasoning in cooperative multi agent distributed 
interpretation systems (CMADISs) [32]. An MSBN is an 
extended form of a Bayesian network and consists of a set of 
interrelated Bayesian subnets that collectively define a 
Bayesian network. Each subnet encodes an agent’s uncertain 
knowledge about a sub-domain. The subnets in an MSBN are 
required to satisfy certain conditions so that probabilistic 
inference can be performed coherently in a modular and 
distributed fashion [33]. These conditions are as follows: 
(a) The subnets in an MSBN must satisfy a hypertree 
condition;  
(b) The interface between a pair of adjacent subnets must 
form a d-sepset. 
In the following, the above two conditions are illustrated in 
a more elaborate manner. 
Definition 1. Let G = (V, E) be a connected graph 
sectioned into subgraphs {Gi = (Vi, Ei)} such that the Gi’s can 
be associated with a tree Ψ, with the following property: 
Each node in Ψ is labeled by a Gi and each link between Gk 
and Gm is labeled by the interface Vk ∩ Vm such that for each 
i and j, Vi ∩ Vj is contained in each subgraph on the path 
between Gi and Gj in Ψ. Then Ψ is a hypertree over G. Each 
Gi is a hypernode and each interface is a hyperlink. 
 
 
Figure 1. The graph G in (a) is sectioned into G0, G1 and G2 
in (b). Ψ   in (c) is a hypertree over G 
 Figure 1 shows an example. In this example V2 ∩ V1 = φ 
(hence the hypertree condition is trivially satisfied). But in 
general Vi  ∩ Vj can be non-empty. 
Definition 2. Let G be a directed graph such that a 
hypertree over G exists. Let x be a node that is contained in 
more than one subgraph and ∏(x) be its parents in G. Then x 
is a d-sepnode if there exists only one subgraph that contains 
∏(x). An interface I is a d-sepset if every x ∈ I is a d-
sepnode. 
Each of a, b, c, j, k in the interfaces of Figure 1 is a d-
sepnode. Hence, the interfaces {a, b, c} and {j, k} are d-
sepsets. If the direction of the arc from j to l were reversed, 
however, the node j would no longer be a d-sepnode and {j, 
k} would no longer be a d-sepset. The hypertree and d-sepset 
conditions together ensure syntactically that the agents can 
inform each other by passing their beliefs on interfaces only. 
In a multi-agent system, a d-sepnode is shared by more 
than one agent and is called a public node. A node internal to 
a single-agent is called a private node. Using the concept of 
d-separation [34], it has been shown that when a pair of 
subnets is isolated from an MSBN, their d-sepset renders 
them conditionally independent. 
Just as the structure of a Bayesian network is a DAG, the 
structure of an MSBN is a Multiply Sectioned DAG 
(MSDAG) with a hypertree organization. 
Definition 3. A hypertree MSDAG G = ∪i Gi, where each 
Gi is a DAG, is a connected DAG such that (i) there exists a 
hypertree Ψ over G, and (ii) each hyperlink in Ψ  is a d-
sepset. Figure 1(b) and 1(c) show a hypertree MSDAG. 
Definition 4. An MSBN M is a triplet (V, G, P ). V = ∪i Vi   
is the domain where each Vi is a set of variables, called a 
sub-domain. G = ∪i Gi (a hypertree MSDAG) is the structure 
where nodes of each DAG Gi are labeled by elements of Vi. 
Let x be a variable and Π(x) be the parents of x in G For each 
x, exactly one of its occurrence (in a Gi containing {x} ∪ 
Π(x)) is assigned P (x | Π(x)), and each occurrence in other 
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DAGs is assigned a uniform potential. P = Πi Pi is the joint 
probability distribution (JPD), where each Pi is the product 
of the potentials associated with the nodes in Gi. A triplet Si = 
(Vi, Gi, Pi) is called a subnet of M. Two subnets Si and Sj are 
said to be adjacent if Gi and Gj are adjacent. 
MSBNs form a coherent framework for probabilistic 
reasoning in CMADISs. Each agent holds its partial 
perspective of a large problem domain, accesses a local 
evidence source, communicates with other agents 
infrequently, reasons with the local evidence and limited 
global evidence, and answers queries or takes actions. It has 
been shown that if all agents are cooperative and each pair of 
adjacent agents (belonging to adjacent subnets) are 
conditionally independent given their shared variables and 
have common initial belief on the shared variables, then a 
joint system belief is well-defined, which is identical to each 
agent’s belief within its sub-domain, and supplemental to the 
agent’s belief outside the sub-domain. Even though multiple 
agents may acquire evidence asynchronously in parallel, the 
communication operations of MSBNs ensure that the answers 
to queries from each agent are consistent with the evidence 
acquired in the entire system after each communication. 
Since communication is infrequent, the operations also 
ensure that between two successive communications the 
answers to queries for each agent are consistent with all local 
evidence gathered so far, and are consistent with all evidence 
gathered in the entire system up to the last communication. 
Therefore, an MSBN can be characterized as one of 
functionally accurate, cooperative distributed system [35]. In 
Section 5, it will be seen how an MSBN can be applied to 
make distributed probabilistic inferences 
4. Architecture of the System and the Agents 
In this section, the architecture of the overall system is 
described. In particular, the architecture of the agents is 
described in detail. The agents collaborate with each other to 
make an efficient distributed intrusion detection framework.  
4.1 System Architecture 
The proposed security mechanism is a distributed, 
lightweight, agent-based intrusion detection system. The 
model architecture is similar to what has been proposed in 
[36], but differs completely in the mechanism of trust 
management and fault-tolerance. In the proposed approach, 
the agents are viewed as autonomous, reflexive, proactive 
and cooperative entities. They are responsible for collecting 
data, analyzing them, and making appropriate inference form 
the analysis. The agents use an inference process that utilizes 
the collected data as evidences in a Bayesian network. 
Monitoring and analysis work is duplicated for accuracy and 
fault tolerance, e.g., handling the possible situations when 
some agents are compromised. 
The agents are grouped into several sub-domains. The 
agents in the same sub-domain communicate actively and 
frequently. Communication between agents belonging to 
adjacent sub-domains happens infrequently. The agents have 
knowledge about a Bayesian network model of the structures 
of well-known attack types as well as normal usage pattern, 
which is constructed offline from data repositories containing 
system logs from ongoing attacks. This global Bayesian 
network has been partitioned into multiple subnets based on 
the spatial locations of the agents. The agents in the same 
sub-domain have the common knowledge of the subnet in 
their sub-domain. Each agent is delegated with 
responsibilities to monitor certain predefined security 
parameters (attack signatures) at the sub-domain in which it 
resides. In addition, some agents are responsible for 
monitoring the network traffic data to detect possible 
network-based attacks.  
Bayesian networks are used to represent the existing 
knowledge of different attack signatures [37]. A Bayesian 
network is capable of capturing the mutual influence of 
different domain variables on target attributes. Using a 
Bayesian network model one can infer the probabilities of 
occurrence of different intrusion types, which are easy for 
human security investigators to interpret. Moreover, this 
representation can easily accommodate prior domain 
knowledge. Bayesian network approach also allows for 
combining two different intrusion detection methodologies 
such as anomaly detection and signature recognition [38]. To 
facilitate this process in the proposed mechanism, one 
Bayesian network is generated whose nodes classify several 
known attack types and normal system behavior. Using this 
network, the agents can detect both normal behavior and a 
known attack type. If the probabilities associated with none 
of the target nodes cross the threshold, given the input feature 
values, an anomalous behavior is suspected. 
As described in Section 6, every host in the system has one 
special agent, called the distributed trust manager (DTM), 
which continuously sends messages to its peers in other 
hosts. By applying the Byzantine agreement protocol (BAP) 
among the peer hosts, the system can identify a host that is 
possibly compromised by a malicious intruder, and isolate 
that host from intrusion detection process. This distributed 
trust mechanism makes the proposed system robust and fault-
tolerant. 
    4.2  Agent Architecture 
Figure 2 depicts the architecture of an agent. Each agent 
consists of six modules. The functionalities of each of these 
modules are briefly described below. 
 
Figure 2. The architecture of an agent embedded in a node 
• Perception module: This module is responsible for 
collection of audit or network data of the sub-domain (or 
subnet) to which the agent belongs.  
• Deliberation module: This module is responsible for 
analyzing the data collected by the Perception module.  
Essentially, its role is to enable the agents to reason and 
extrapolate by relying on built-in knowledge (beliefs) and 
experience in a rational way. Decisions of the agents 
depend on the security environment status, and collected 
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evidence. It also allows an agent to update its belief 
associated with the node of the subnet it is monitoring. 
• Communication module: This module allows an agent 
to communicate its belief, decisions, and knowledge to its 
peer agents. The inference made by an agent is passed to 
its peers in the same sub-domain, and possibly, to other 
sub-domains also.  
• Action module: The role of this module is to take 
appropriate actions when a possible intrusion is detected.  
When an agent recognizes that a monitored host is 
exceeding the threshold of one known attack, it triggers 
an alert for that particular attack and communicates it to 
the system administrator. Besides this signature-based 
detection, the agents can also trigger an alert indicating 
‘an anomalous situation’, when the activated target node 
does not belong to those representing normal behavior or 
any of the known attack types considered while the 
Bayesian network was constructed. The system 
administrator can either confirm the attack (or take 
necessary steps to handle it), or reject the alert if it is 
found to be a false alarm on further probing.   
• Knowledgebase update module: If the system 
administrator confirms an anomaly alert, a Bayesian 
network is modified to accommodate this new attack in 
the knowledge base. This attack is now recognized as a 
known attack and will be considered as an attack 
signature for future monitoring purpose. Thus the agents 
are adaptive to the discovery of new types of network 
intrusions. 
• Supervisory module: This is the central module that 
coordinates the tasks and interactions among the other 
modules described above. 
5. Communication and Security 
Three types of agents are deployed in the proposed system. 
Figure 3 shows the interactions among different types of 
agents.  
 
 
Figure 3. The major components of the system 
The system monitoring agents are responsible for 
collecting, transforming, and distributing intrusion specific 
data upon request and evoke information collection 
procedures. These agents publish the details of the variables 
they monitor, which can be utilized by other agents. The 
intrusion monitoring agents subscribe to beliefs published by 
the system monitoring agents and other intrusion monitoring 
agents. Each intrusion monitoring agent has a local 
knowledge about a Bayesian network structure of attack 
types. These agents update their beliefs on receipt of 
information from other agents. For each registered agent, a 
registry maintains information about the monitored variables. 
The agents use the registry to find information (e.g., name 
and location) about agents that may supply required data. 
Once location and the name of an agent providing required 
data are found, the registry need not be referred again. The 
messages exchanged between the agents are in extensible 
markup language (XML). The important messages 
exchanged are: i) registration of agents with registry agents, 
ii) request to registry agents for finding the locations of other 
agents, iii) search of agent queries, iv) belief subscription 
requests, v) belief update messages. 
There are two categories of communications among 
agents: communications among agents residing at the same 
host, and communication among agents on different hosts. 
Figure 4 shows these two different types of communications. 
Different mechanisms for these two types of message 
communications have been proposed and compared in some 
works [38][39][40]. In case of communication among agents 
in the same host, the agents communicate using methods like 
pipes, message queues, and shared memory. In the proposed 
mechanism, a shared memory architecture is used for agent 
communication since it allows large volume of data to be 
shared among agents [8]. In case of communication among 
agents over the network, it is not worthwhile to replicate the 
same method of communication for each agent. Instead, an 
agent management system (AMS) which enables 
communication between different agents for intra-host and 
inter-host communication will be a much more efficient 
scheme. In the prototype system developed, the capabilities 
provided by the java agent development environment 
(JADE) [39] environment have been utilized to build an 
AMS. 
 
 
Figure 4. The architecture of agent communication 
All the message communications among the agents are 
made secure by incorporating cryptographic mechanisms. 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is used to provide two-way 
authentication of agents and messages. The messages 
communicated among the agents are all encrypted using 
private key encryption mechanism. 
6. Intrusion Detection using Bayesian 
Hypothesis 
This section describes how the concepts of Bayesian 
networks and MSBNs are applied in the domain of intrusion 
detection with the help of a set of cooperative agents. The 
agents are grouped so that they form a Bayesian network and 
a distributed inference mechanism is developed among them 
with the help of an MSBN. 
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    6.1  Bayesian Network in Intrusion Detection 
In Section 3, a Bayesian network has been defined as a 
directed acyclic graph (DAG) with the nodes representing the 
variables, and each directed edges representing a dependency 
between the corresponding variables. The effect of the 
parents of a node on a node is represented by conditional 
probabilities of that variable given values of its parent nodes 
in the form of a conditional probability table (CPT). In 
security domain, it is useful to represent a set of attack 
signatures by a Bayesian network for the following reasons. 
Firstly, a Bayesian network can handle incomplete 
information. In most of the case, the agents may have limited 
local view of the network and may receive only partial 
information about a possible attack. Secondly, a Bayesian 
network can represent causal relationships among variables, 
which can help an intrusion detection model to combine a 
priori knowledge and observed data to take a decision. 
Lastly, a Bayesian network allows updating of the beliefs and 
thus can be used to recognize novel attack signatures by the 
intrusion detection system. In the proposed security system, a 
Bayesian network is first constructed from a database of 
known attacks. This network is then partitioned into several 
sub-trees following the principle of MSBNs [4], and 
distributed among the agents. The agents belonging to 
different subnets communicate among themselves, update 
their beliefs about different events, and carry out a 
distributed intrusion detection activity [41]. 
    6.2 Inference with MSBNs 
An MSBN consists of a set of interrelated Bayesian subnets 
each of which encodes an agent’s knowledge of a sub-
domain. In such a framework, probabilistic inference can be 
performed in a distributed fashion, while answers to queries 
are exact with respect to probability theory. Existing methods 
for multi-agent inference in MSBNs are extensions of a class 
of methods for inference in single-agent Bayesian networks: 
message passing in junction trees [3][37][42]. The linked 
junction forest (LJF) method [43][44] compiles each subnet 
of a multiply connected network into a junction tree (JT), by 
clustering the triangulated moral graph of the underlying 
undirected graph. The algorithm performs message 
propagation over the JT.  Message passing among agents 
belonging to two adjacent subnets is performed through a 
linkage tree between a pair of adjacent nodes each belonging 
to adjacent subnets.  Though the exact belief update in a 
Bayesian network is NP-hard [45][46], it can still be used for 
the purpose of intrusion detection since the subnet sizes are 
usually small. 
 
 
Figure 5. The DAGs of the three subnets of an MSBN and 
JTs constructed from the subnet  
Figure 5 shows an MSBN with three subnets G0, G1, G2.  
Each of these subnets contains a group of agents. The 
knowledge of a group of agents is encoded in the 
corresponding subnet to which it belongs. The LJF method 
has compiled each of three subnets into a JT (called a local 
JT), and has converted each d-sepset into a JT (also called 
linkage tree). Figure 5 also depicts three local JTs and two 
linkage trees of the monitoring system. Each oval in a JT or a 
linkage tree represents a subset of variables and is called a 
cluster. For instance, {o, i, j} is a cluster in a JT in the subnet 
G2 and {i, j} is a cluster in the linkage tree between subnets 
G2 and G0. Local inference is performed by message passing 
in the local JT. Message passing between a pair of adjacent 
sub-domains is performed using the linkage tree. 
Once a multi-agent MSBN is constructed, agents may 
perform probabilistic inference by computing the query 
P(x|e), where x is any variable within the sub-domain of a 
group of agents, and e is the observations made by all the 
agents in the system. The key computation is to propagate the 
impact of observations to all the agents in the entire system. 
This system-wide communication among the agents is vital 
for sharing of information among agents belonging to 
different sub-domains. As the agents are designed to be 
autonomous, the need for system-wide message passing 
arises infrequently. Most of the time, the agents in subnet Gi 
computes the query P(x|ei, ei′), where ei is the local 
observations made by the agents in  Gi, and ei′ is the 
observations made by the agents of other sub-domains as 
recorded in Gi till the last communication. This computation 
is called local inference. It has been proved that among 
different distributed multi-agent inference algorithms in 
MSBNs, LJF has least overhead of inter-agent 
communication [33]. Thus use of LJF method ensures that 
the network traffic due to the security mechanism is kept to a 
minimum. 
7. Fault- Tolerance and Trust Mechanism 
In this section, a novel approach for introducing fault-
tolerance in the proposed system is described. A distributed 
trust management scheme is developed among the agents in 
the system and a robust algorithm based on Byzantine 
agreement protocol (BAP) [47] is invoked among the peer 
agents. This enables a reliable and fast detection of any 
compromised agents in the system. If any agent is detected to 
be compromised, it is immediately isolated from the system. 
This makes the intrusion detection mechanism reliable, 
secure and fault-tolerant.  
    7.1  Distributed Trust Management 
The agents in a distributed intrusion detection system are 
always vulnerable to attacks by intruders. If an intruder can 
compromise any host in the system, the detection capability 
of the entire system will be severely affected. The agents in a 
compromised host will attempt to influence the JT and their 
effect will be propagated in the entire system by the message 
passing mechanism among the agents unless the 
compromised host is detected and isolated promptly. To 
ensure early detection of any compromised host(s) in the 
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system, an efficient trust management scheme based on 
Byzantine Agreement Protocol is developed among the peer 
hosts.  
    7.2  The Byzantine Generals Problem 
Lamport et al described the Byzantine generals problem in 
[47]. Essentially, the problem formulation is as follows: 
Imagine that several divisions of a Byzantine army are 
camped outside an enemy city, each division commanded by 
its own general. The generals can communicate with each 
other only by messengers. After observing the enemy, they 
must decide upon a common plan of action. However, some 
of the generals may be traitors, trying to prevent the loyal 
generals from reaching agreement. The generals must have 
an algorithm to guarantee that all loyal generals decide upon 
the same plan of action. The loyal generals will all do what 
the algorithm asks them to do, but the traitors may do 
anything they wish. The loyal generals should not only arrive 
at an agreement but should agree upon a reasonable plan. 
Lamport devised two solutions to this problem –the Oral 
Message Algorithm (OMA) and the Signed Message 
Algorithm (SMA) [47]. The OMA requires more than 2n 
messages to be sent for achieving the consensus, if there are 
n generals and it works only if the number of loyal generals is 
greater than twice the number of traitors [47]. The SMA, in 
contrast, requires only O(n2) messages to achieve consensus, 
and works effectively if there are at most n - 2 number of 
traitors [47]. Moreover, n comparison to OMA, SMA works 
faster. However, as discussed in Section 6.3, SMA requires 
more number of necessary conditions to be met by the 
system.  
    7.3  Byzantine Agreement Protocol – Signed Message 
Algorithm 
The Byzantine agreement protocol (BAP) is essentially an 
algorithm designed to achieve consensus among nodes in a 
distributed system. A set of processes can arrive at a 
consensus if they all agree on some allowed values called the 
‘outcome’ (if they could agree on any value the solution 
would be trivial: always agree on 0). Thus arriving at a 
consensus involves two actions: first specify a value, and the 
read the outcome of execution of the processes involved. The 
consensus algorithm terminates when all non-faulty (not 
compromised) processes come to know the outcome.  If we 
consider the generals in BAP as the hosts in a distributed 
system, and the consensus as the requirement of agreement 
among the hosts as which agents are safe/sane (i.e. not 
compromised), then the problem of identifying and isolating 
any compromised host(s) in a distributed can be described 
more formally as follows. 
Consider a distributed system consisting of several hosts 
with each host having a set of agents running on it. The 
agents cooperate to detect intrusions into the system. Each 
host runs a special agent, called the distributed trust manager 
(DTM), which continuously sends messages to its peers on 
other hosts. The message can be of two types:  i) Message 
A1: The host is safe (i.e. not compromised), with a value “0”. 
ii) Message A2: “The host is compromised with a value, “1”. 
The signature of the possible intrusion also may be sent along 
with this message. 
The Signed Message Algorithm will work correctly if we 
can guarantee the following: 
• Every message sent by any host is delivered correctly. 
• The receiver of a message knows who the sender is. 
• The absence of a message in the buffer of a host can be 
detected. 
• The signature of a legitimate (i.e. not compromised) host 
cannot be forged; any alteration made on a signed 
message can be detected. 
Any host can verify the authentication of the signature of its 
general. 
With cryptographic mechanisms based on Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI), it is possible to ensure all the conditions 
stated above, and thus SMA can be assumed to work well in 
a security framework based on cryptography. 
Algorithm: Signed_Message(m) 
Initially Vi = φ 
[1] The commander signs and sends its value to every 
host Hi that it can reach directly. 
[2] For each i 
(A) if the host Hi receives a message of the 
form v : 0 from the commander and 
it has not received any order, then 
(i) it lets Vi equal {v}; 
(ii) it sends the message v : 0 : i to 
every other host. 
(B) if the host Hi receives a message of the 
form v : 0 : j1,j2,…jk and v is not in the set 
Vi, then 
                 (i) it adds v to Vi, 
                                      (ii) if k < m, then it sends the 
message v : 0 : j1,j2,…jk: i to every host  
                                            other than Hj1, Hj2, ..Hjk. 
[3] For each i: When the host Hi will receive no more 
messages, it obeys the order choice(Vi). 
 
In the Signed Message Algorithm, one of the hosts acts as 
the leader and sends an order to the other hosts. Whenever a 
host receives a message, it takes the order and puts it in its 
list of the orders received. Then the receiver signs the 
message with its own signature and forwards it to all the 
hosts whose signature is not on the order. If a host receives a 
message with an order that is already in his list, he ignores 
the message. When no more messages are left to be received, 
all the hosts choose an order from the list of orders they have 
received using this method. If only one order has been 
received, then that order is chosen. Because any order that 
reaches a loyal general will be forwarded to all other generals 
who have not seen the order, all the loyal generals will have 
the same set of orders to choose from, and thus choose the 
same order to obey. 
7.4  Distributed Trust Manager 
The role of the DTM is described in this section. The concept 
of DTM has been borrowed from [48], where it is utilized for 
establishing and managing trust in a distributed environment. 
DTM is largely responsible for forming and maintaining trust 
domains. A trust domain is a set of hosts that share a charter 
and a security policy, and behave consistently in accordance 
with that policy. The hosts in a trust domain work in 
collaboration to prevent compromised hosts from joining the 
trust domain. If any host becomes compromised after joining 
a trust domain, other hosts in the domain will be able to 
detect it and isolate it.  
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DTM uses a consensus algorithm among the members of 
the trust domain to perform its task. We assume that at the 
beginning of a trust domain formation, all the hosts in the 
trust domain are sane. In other words, initially, none of the 
hosts in a trust domain are compromised. DTM tries to detect 
and remove any host that becomes compromised after it has 
joined the trust domain. Any compromised host in the trust 
domain is identified by running n instances (n is the max 
number of hosts in the trust domain) of the Signed_ Message 
algorithm in parallel, assuming that the majority of the hosts 
in the trust domain are not compromised. If the leader of the 
Signed_Message algorithm is not compromised, then after 
running the algorithm in parallel, all the host that are not 
compromised will know that the leader is not compromised. 
If the leader of an execution of the Signed_Message 
algorithm is compromised, then any of the following 
situations will occur: 
• The leader sends 0 messages to all hosts that are not 
compromised. In this case, all the hosts that are not 
compromised will assume the host (leader) to be 
compromised or dead. 
• The leader sends 1 message to only some of the hosts that 
are not compromised. In this case, the hosts that are not 
compromised and receive 1 message from the leader are 
able to detect that there is a compromised host in the 
system. These hosts, then, send messages to other hosts in 
the system accusing the suspected compromised hosts. 
The accused hosts are then tested, and are determined to 
be compromised or not compromised. 
• The leader sends 1 message to all the hosts that are not 
compromised. All the hosts that are not compromised 
understand that the message is wrong, and the host 
(leader) is compromised, if it contradicts the majority. If 
the message does not contradict the majority, the leader 
cannot be detected to be compromised, unless it sends a 
different message to at least one compromised host, 
which in turn forwards the message to another host that is 
not compromised. Although the leader should be removed 
in this case, it is not a critical problem, as it is not causing 
any damage to the system at present. 
• The leader sends two (or more) different messages to 
some hosts that are not compromised. All the hosts that 
are not compromised see contradictory instructions, and 
understand that the host (leader) is compromised. 
It is, therefore, observed that DTM can identify 
compromised hosts in the system in all possible cases, and 
isolate it from the trust domain.  
8. Experiments and Results 
A proof-of-concept prototype for the proposed IDS has been 
built using Java and JADE [39]. JADE is a middleware 
developed by Telecom Italia Lab (TILAB) for enabling faster 
development of multi-agent distributed applications based on 
the peer-to-peer communication architecture. JADE has been 
implemented fully in Java. It includes both the libraries (i.e. 
the Java classes) required to develop application agents, and 
the run-time environment that provides the basic services and 
that must be active on the host before agents can be executed. 
From the functional point of view, JADE provides all the 
basic services necessary for distributed peer-to-peer 
applications. It allows each agent to dynamically discover 
other agents and to communicate with them by message 
passing mechanism. The agents communicate by exchanging 
asynchronous messages- the communication model 
universally accepted for distributed systems. Each agent is 
identified by a unique identifier and provides a set of 
services. An agent can register its services and search for 
other agents providing given services. It can control its life 
cycle also. 
In the prototype developed, each agent is endowed with 
three behavioral capabilities: filtering, interaction, and 
deliberation. The filtering behavior of an agent enables it to 
filter security events from the observations it makes. When 
an event occurs in the network, it is collected by an agent 
only if it matches with the event classes specified in the 
detection goal of the agent. The interaction behavior manages 
the interaction between different agents. It defines the 
mailbox of the agent, and the way the messages are received 
and enqueued for later interpretation. The deliberation 
behavior of an agent allows it to represent its beliefs, goals, 
intentions, and knowledge in a semantic format. When an 
agent receives a detection goal, it updates a set of event 
classes to filter. When an event occurs, it is filtered by the 
filtering module and sent to the deliberation module. The 
deliberation module updates /creates the agent’s beliefs, and 
tests whether the belief matches with an attack signature. If it 
matches, then a detection goal is reached and a list of 
intentions is sent to the interaction module for execution.  
Essentially, development of agents under JADE 
framework involves the following steps of activities: 
• Determination of the agent behaviors. 
• Implementation of the agent class (extending the existing 
classes of JADE). 
• Implementation of the agent meta-behavior by 
instantiating an existing class or introducing a new class 
and then instantiating it. The meta-behavior provides an 
agent with a self-control mechanism to dynamically 
schedule its behaviors in accordance with its internal 
state. 
• Instantiation of the agent class. 
• Initializing the agent acquaintances. 
• Deployment and activation of the agent. 
Some experiments have been conducted to test the 
performance of the developed prototype. In the experiments, 
the KDD Cup 1999 intrusion detection contest data [49] has 
been used.  This data was compiled during 1998 DARPA 
intrusion detection and evaluation program by MIT Lincoln 
Lab [50]. The original data contains 744 MB of information 
with 4.94 million records. The dataset has 41 attributes for 
each connection record plus one connection record 
specifying one of 24 different types of attacks or normal 
condition. Thus, effectively each record is given a class label 
that specifies the category of attack to which the record 
belongs. All the attacks are grouped into 4 major categories: 
(i) denial of service (DoS), (ii) remote to local (R2L), (iii) 
user to root (U2L), and (iv) probe.  
We constructed a dataset consisting of 15000 records by 
randomly selecting records from the original database, such 
that the number of data instances selected from each class 
was proportional to their frequencies in the original database. 
We added one more class of records that we call ‘normal’ 
class apart from the 4 attack types mentioned above. The 
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knowledge about these attacks is then distributed among the 
agents in the system. A Bayesian Network Power Constructor 
(BNPC) [51] is used to generate a Bayesian network from 
these sampled records. This sample will contain both attack 
signatures and normal records (i.e. the event sequence that 
does not constitute an attack).  This Bayesian network is 
sectioned into multiple subnets utilizing the rules for sound                                                                                    
Table 1.  Impact of the IDs on User Applications
 
Number of users 10 20 30 40 50 
Memory required with IDS (K) 331 471 601 710 795 
Memory. required without IDS (K) 324 453 572 669 740 
CPU usage with IDS (%) 53 67 80 86 92 
CPU usage without IDS (%) 48 63 75 82 87 
 
partitioning in MSBN [4].  Finally, the LJF method [4] is 
used for intrusion detection. 
The performance of the prototype has been tested in a 
network of 50 workstations, with each workstation having 
Pentium 4 processor, 3GHz clock speed, 1 GB RAM, and 
Red Hat Linux version 9 as the operating system. The data-
rate of the Ethernet was 100 MBPS. The attack knowledge 
base was distributed among the agents in the workstations in 
the form of a MSBN as described earlier. 
The evaluate the performance overhead of the IDS, the 
average memory space required and the average CPU usage 
on the workstations were observed with varying number of 
active users. For this purpose, the number active users were 
varied from 10 to 50 and the average load on the 
workstations was noted. Table 1 summarizes the results. It is 
evident that the average memory and the CPU usage on a 
workstation due to the IDS were marginal and the overhead 
decreased with the increase in the number of users. This 
makes the system scalable.   
To test the CPU utilization by the agents, some attacks are 
simulated on the workstations and in the network. The attacks 
included guess_passwd, buffer_overflow, portsweep, 
teardrop, mailbomb, etc.  
During the thirty-minute analysis period, the maximum 
CPU utilization of the agents was found to be only 8.76%, 
the average utilization of the entire period being 5.34%. It is 
evident that the proposed IDS has a fairly low memory and 
computational overhead. 
Using Ethereal network sniffer [52] (a software to capture 
and analyze information being transmitted over a network), 
the network was monitored and the bandwidth consumption 
of the agents was evaluated. First, the network traffic volume 
was observed without the IDS agents running on the 
workstations and then the agents are activated on all the 50 
workstations and traffic volume in the network was 
monitored again. From the data collected by the sniffer, it 
was evident that the agents had very little bandwidth 
consumption.  
During the one-hour time when the agents were active on 
the workstations, the sniffer found only 15% increase in the 
number of packets in the network as  compared with the one-
hour period without the agents. The average bandwidth 
consumption by the agents never exceeded 5% of the 100 
MBPS Ethernet. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Operational Performance of the IDS Prototype 
Activity 
Type 
Detection Rate (%) False Positive (%)    
 
Proposed 
IDS 
Li et al 
IDS 
Proposed 
IDS 
DoS 98.25 97.57 10.25 
R2L  7.31  0.37 12.43 
U2R 86.42 71.49 10.57 
Probe 94.28 90.49 11.87 
Normal 97.80 98.13  7.31 
 
For testing the detection efficiency and the false positive 
rates of the proposed IDS, 37 different attacks are simulated 
on the workstations and on the network. The victim and the 
attacking workstations are chosen randomly so as to test all 
the part of the network. While the attacks are simulated in the 
network and the workstations, some of attacks are chosen in 
such a way that they are not in the knowledge base of the 
agents in the IDS. This is done to test the ability of the IDS to 
detect novel attacks.  
The detection efficiency of the proposed IDS is also 
compared with a recently proposed scheme by Li et al. [53]. 
From Table 2, it is evident that except for the ‘normal’ 
category, the detection efficiency of the proposed IDS is 
better than the scheme proposed by Li et al. [53]. 
The better performance of the proposed scheme is due to 
the robust knowledge base building and inference mechanism 
of the JADE environment. However, like most of the existing 
IDS schemes, the proposed scheme has a low detection rate 
for R2L attacks. Although, the detection rate for these attacks 
is much higher compared to Li et al.’s scheme, it is far from 
satisfactory. Since R2L attacks are essentially different from 
the other types of attacks, there is a need for a different 
approach to the detection logic design for these types of 
attacks. The DTM scheme is mostly responsible for higher 
detection rates in DoS and probe attacks. The false positive 
rates for all attack types were found to be fairly low as may 
be observed from Table 2.  
Finally, the performance of the trust management system is 
studied. For this purpose, a group of nodes is chosen 
randomly for formation of the trust domain.  
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Once the formation of the trust domain is done, attacks are 
simulated on some of the nodes in the trust domain from 
outside the network. The DTM in each node is activated and 
time required to identify and isolate the compromised nodes 
are studied. This experiment is conducted 50 times, and in all 
occasions it has been observed that the compromised nodes 
in the trust domain are identified and isolated from the 
network activities by the other nodes in the trust domain. The 
maximum time for detection and isolation was observed to be 
35 s and the average time being 15 s. The maximum time was 
observed when the network was having a very heavy traffic 
and all the nodes were busy with intensive applications 
running on them. The results thus show that the trust 
management system is also very effective and efficient.  
9. Conclusion 
In this paper, the framework of a distributed IDS is 
presented. The IDS consists of a set of autonomous agents 
that cooperate with each other to carry out a distributed 
intrusion detection process. Using distributed computation 
and message passing between the agents, the IDS can detect 
both signature-based attacks and anomalous activities in real-
time. Apart from its ability to make distributed inference 
based on multiply sectioned Bayesian networks, the proposed 
IDS can also identify and isolate any compromised nodes in 
the system with the help of Byzantine Agreement Protocol 
among the peer nodes. The experiments conducted on the 
prototype of the system have shown that the detection 
efficiency and the false positive rates of the proposed IDS is 
better than some of the currently existing scheme. 
Development of a new detection logic for R2L types of 
attacks constitutes a future plan of work. 
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